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Abstract—Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are evolving as 
a key technology for next-generation wireless networks 
showing raid progress and numerous applications. These 
networks have the potential to provide robust and high-
throughput data delivery to wireless users. In a WMN, high 
speed routers equipped with advanced antennas, 
communicate with each other in a multi-hop fashion over 
wireless channels and form a broadband backhaul. 
However, the throughput of a WMN may be severely 
degraded due to presence of some selfish routers that avoid 
forwarding packets for other nodes even as they send their 
own traffic through the network. This paper presents an 
algorithm for detection of selfish nodes in a WMN. It uses 
statistical theory of inference for reliable clustering of the 
nodes and is based on local observations by the nodes. 
Simulation results show that the algorithm has a high 
detection rate while having a low rate of false positives. 
 
Index Terms—Wireless mesh networks, AODV protocol, 
selfish nodes, clustering, node misbehavior.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless mesh networking has emerged as a promising 
concept to meet the challenges in next-generation 
networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and 
reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective 
solutions to the service providers [1]. Unlike traditional 
Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected 
to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs 
are required to be connected to the wired network. The 
APs that are connected to the wired network are called 
the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that do not 
have wired connections are called the mesh routers 
(MRs). The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-
hop communication. Due to the recent research advances 
in WMNs, these networks have been used in numerous 
applications such as in home networking, community and 
neighborhood monitoring, security surveillance systems, 
disaster management and rescue operations etc [2].  
In a community-based WMN, a group of MRs 
managed by different operators form an access network 
to provide last-mile connectivity to the Internet. As with 
any end-user supported infrastructure, ubiquitous 
cooperative behavior in these networks cannot be 
assumed a priori. Preserving scarce access bandwidth and 
power, as well as security concerns may induce some 
selfish users to avoid forwarding data for other nodes, 
even as they send their own traffic through the network. 
However, the selfish behavior of an MR degrades the 
performance of a WMN since it increases the latency in 
packet delivery and packet drops and decreases the 
network throughput. 
To enforce cooperation among nodes and detect selfish 
nodes in ad hoc wireless networks, various collaboration 
schemes have been proposed in the literature [3]. 
Majority of these proposals are based on trust and 
reputation frameworks which attempts to identify 
misbehaving nodes by suitable decision making systems 
and then isolate or punish them. The reputation of 
participating nodes is built based on local observation at 
the node, second-hand observation at other nodes or both.  
To address the issue of selfish nodes in a WMN, this 
paper presents a scheme that uses local observations in 
the nodes for detecting node misbehavior. The scheme is 
applicable for on-demand routing protocol like AODV, 
and uses statistical theory of inference and clustering 
techniques to make a robust and reliable classification 
(cooperative or selfish) of  the nodes based on their 
packet forwarding activities as observed by their 
neighbors. In addition, it introduces some additional 
fields in the packet header for AODV protocol so that 
detection accuracy is increased. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents some related work. Section III gives a brief 
background of the AODV protocol and a finite state 
machine model of the local observations of a node. The 
proposed scheme is described in Section III. Section IV 
presents simulations results, and Section V concludes the 
paper while identifying some potential future work. 
II.     RELATED WORK 
The concept of neighborhood monitoring to check the 
activities of other nodes has been proposed by researchers 
in a number of mechanisms especially in the context of 
wireless ad hoc networks. The idea of watchdog 
mechanism to monitor neighbors was first proposed by 
Marti et al [4]. A scheme named pathrater was also 
proposed to avoid misbehaving nodes in routing. 
Buchegger and Boudec have proposed the CONFIDANT 
protocol that assigns a rating for every node in an ad hoc 
network based on watchdog and second-hand rating 
information gathered from other nodes [5].  
Mahajan et al have proposed a mechanism named 
CATCH [6], which consists of two modules: (i) 
anonymous challenge message (ACM) and (ii) 
anonymous neighbor verification (ANV). First, an ACM 
message from an unknown sender is sent to all its 
neighbors. As the sender is unknown, all the nodes 
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further broadcast the ACM message. In the ANV phase, a 
tester node sends cryptographic hash of a random token 
for rebroadcast and also records other hashes sent by 
others. The tester node releases the secret token to 
another node which successfully authenticates itself.  
Vigna et al have proposed an approach to detect 
intrusions in AODV that works by stateful signature-
based analysis of the observed traffic [7]. Sensors are 
placed on selected nodes for promiscuous sensing of 
radio channels. Each sensor has database of attack 
signatures and looks for a signature match in the traffic. 
A match triggers a response, usually an alert.  
Pirzada and McDonald [8] have described a model of 
building trust relationship between nodes in an ad hoc 
network. The nodes passively monitor the packets 
received and forwarded by other nodes and compute the 
trust values for their neighbors. The trust values are used 
for computing the trustworthiness of links. For routing, 
links with high trust values are chosen so as to avoid the 
malicious and selfish nodes. 
Conti et al [9] have proposed a scheme in which a node 
exploits its local knowledge to estimate the reliability of a 
path. Unlike the conventional method of denying selfish 
users, it provides a degraded service to these nodes by 
selective slow packet forwarding.  
Santhanam et al [10] have presented a mechanism to 
judge a node’s behavior based on observed traffic reports 
submitted to local sink agents, dispersed throughout the 
network. The sink nodes apply a set of forwarding rules 
to isolate a selfish node based on the number of times it is 
caught in selfish acts. The scheme is independent of the 
routing protocol or network architecture, and is suitable 
for multi-channel wireless mesh network. 
Tseng et al. have applied techniques based on finite 
state machines to detect misbehaving nodes in AODV 
routing protocol [11]. The approach involves monitoring 
nodes that cooperate with each other and aggregate their 
observations at different locations in the network. 
Yang et al [12] have described the SCAN protocol that 
addresses two issues simultaneously: (i) routing (control 
packets) misbehavior, and (ii) forwarding (data packets) 
misbehavior. Each node monitors its neighbors 
independently and the nodes in a neighborhood 
collaborate with each other through a distributed 
consensus protocol.  
The proposed mechanism in this paper relies on local 
observation of each node in a WMN. Based on the local 
information in each node and using a finite state machine 
model of the AODV protocol, a robust statistical theory 
of estimation is applied to identify selfish nodes in the 
network. The proposed mechanism is a modification of 
the protocol proposed in [13]. The objective of the 
proposed mechanism is to achieve higher detection 
efficiency by exploiting the information in some 
additional fields in the packet header in AODV routing. 
This is explained in Section IV.  
III.     AODV AND MODELING OF THE STATE MACHINE 
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing 
protocol uses an on-demand approach for finding routes 
to a destination node. It employs destination sequence 
numbers to identify the most recent path. The source 
node and the intermediate nodes store the next-hop 
information corresponding to each flow for data packet 
transmission. The source node floods the route request 
(RREQ) packet in the network when a route is not 
available for the desired destination. It may obtain 
multiple routes to different destinations from a single 
RREQ. The RREQ carries the source identifier (src_id), 
the destination identifier (dest_id), the source sequence 
number (src_seq_num), the destination sequence number 
(dest_seq_num), the broadcast identifier (bcast_id), and 
the time to live (TTL). When an intermediate node 
receives a RREQ, it either forwards the request further or 
prepares a route reply (RREP) if it has a valid route to the 
destination. Every intermediate node, while forwarding a 
RREQ, enters the previous node address and its BcastID. 
A timer is used to delete this entry in case a RREP is not 
received before the timer expires. This helps in storing an 
active path at the intermediate node as AODV does not 
employ source routing of data packets. When a node 
receives a RREP packet, information of the previous node 
from which the packet was received is also stored, so that 
data packets may be routed to that node as the next hop 
toward the destination. 
It is clear that AODV depends heavily on cooperation 
among the nodes for its successful operation. A selfish 
node can easily manipulate the protocol to minimize its 
chances of being included on routes for it is neither the 
source nor the destination. It may drop or tamper with the 
RREQ messages to ensure that no routes will ever be 
selected through it. Alternatively, it may drop, delay, or 
modify the RREP messages so as to prevent the replies 
from reaching the source node. The proposed mechanism 
attempts to detect selfish nodes in a WMN so that these 
nodes may be isolated from the network. In the following 
subsection, the finite state machine model of the protocol 
is presented.  
A.  Finite State Machine Model 
In the proposed mechanism, with AODV as the 
underlying routing protocol, the set of all messages 
corresponding to a RREQ flooding and the unicast RREP 
is referred to as a message unit. It is clear that no node in 
the network can observe all the transmission in a message 
unit. The subset of a message unit that a node can observe 
is referred to as the local message unit (LMU). The LMU 
for a particular node consists of the messages transmitted 
by that node, the messages transmitted by all its 
neighbors, and messages overheard by the node.  The 
detection of selfish nodes is made on the basis of data 
collected by each node from its observed LMUs. 
Corresponding to each message transmission in an 
LMU, a node maintains a record of its sender, and the 
receiver in its neighborhood. It also keeps record of the 
neighbor nodes that receive the RREQ broadcast 
messages sent by the node itself. The messages are 
assumed to follow the sequence of the AODV protocol.  
The finite state machine shown in Fig. 1 depicts 
various states through which a neighbor node undergoes 
for each LMU [13]. The corresponding states for the 
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numbers mentioned in Fig.1 can be found in Table I. To 
distinguish the finals states, these states are shaded.  
Every message transmission by a node causes a state 
transition in each of its neighbor’s finite state machine. 
The finite state machine in one neighbor node gives only 
a local view of the activities of the node being monitored. 
It does not in any way, represents the actual behavior of 
the monitored node. The collaborative participation of 
each neighbor node makes it possible to get an accurate 
global picture regarding the monitored node’s behavior. 
In the rest of the paper, a node whose activity is being 
monitored by its neighbors is referred to as a monitored 
node, and its neighbors are referred to as a monitor node. 
In the proposed protocol, each node plays the dual role of 
a monitor node and a monitored node for each of its 
neighbors.  
TABLE I.  STATES OF FINITE STATE MACHINE  FOR AN LMU 
State Interpretation 
1: init 
2:unexp RREP 
3: rcvd RREQ 
4:fwd RREQ 
5: timeout RREQ 
6:rcvd RREP 
7:LMU complete 
8: timeout RREP 
Initial phase; no RREQ is observed 
Receipt of a  RREP without RREQ observed 
Receipt of a RREQ observed 
Broadcast of a RREQ observed 
Timeout after receipt of RREQ 
Receipt of a RREP observed 
Forwarding of a valid a RREP observed 
Timeout after receipt of a RREP 
 
Each monitor node in the network observes a series of 
interleaved LMUs for a routing session. Each LMU can 
be identified by the source-destination pair contained in a 
RREQ message. Let us denote the kth LMU observed by a 
monitor node as (sk, dk). The pair (sk, dk) does not 
uniquely identify a LMU as a source can issue multiple 
RREQs for the same destination. However, since the 
subsequent RREQs have some delays associated with 
them, we can safely assume that there is only one active 
LMU (sk, dk) in the network at any point of time. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Finite state machine of a monitored node   
Before the beginning of a routing process, a monitored 
node starts with the state 1 in its finite state machine. As 
the monitor node(s) observes the behavior of the 
monitored node by examining the LMUs, it records a 
sequence of transitions form its initial state 1 to one of its 
possible final states - 5, 7 and 8.   
When a monitor node broadcasts a RREQ, it assumes 
that the monitored node has received it. The monitor node, 
therefore, records a state transition 1 ? 3 for the 
monitored node’s finite state machine. If a monitor node 
observes a monitored node to broadcast a RREQ, then a 
state transition of 3 ? 4 is recorded if the RREQ message 
was previously sent by the monitor node to the monitored 
node; otherwise a transition of 1 ? 4 will be recorded 
meaning thereby that the RREQ was received by the 
monitored node from some other neighbor. The transition 
to a timeout state occurs when a monitor node finds no 
activity by the monitored node for the concerned LMU 
before the expiry of a timer. When a monitor node 
observe a monitored node to forward a RREP, it records a 
transition to the final state – LMU complete (state no 7). 
At this state, the monitored node becomes a candidate for 
inclusion on a routing path.  
 
 
Figure 2.  An example LMU observed by node N   
Fig. 2 depicts an example of LMU observed by the 
node N during the discovery of a route from the source 
node S to the destination node D indicated by bold lines. 
Table II shows the events observed by node N and the 
corresponding state transitions for each of its three 
neighbor nodes X, Y and Z.  
When the final state is reached, the finite state machine 
terminates and the corresponding sequences of state 
transitions are stored by each node for each of its 
neighbors. When sufficient number of events is collected 
by a node, a statistical analysis is performed to detect the 
presence of any selfish nodes in the network. 
TABLE II.  STATE TRANSITIONS OF THE NEIGHBORS OF NODE N 
Neighbor Events State changes 
X X broadcasts RREQ 
N broadcasts RREQ 
N sends RREP to X 
X sends RREP to S (overheard) 
1 ? 4 
4 ? 4 
4 ? 6 
6 ? 7 
Y Y broadcasts RREQ 
N broadcasts RREQ 
Timeout 
1 ? 4 
4 ? 4 
4 ? 5 
Z N broadcasts RREQ 
Z broadcasts RREQ 
Z sends RREP to N 
1 ? 3 
3 ? 4 
4 ? 7 
IV.    THE PROPOSED  ALGORITHM 
As mentioned in the previous section, a monitoring 
node keeps a record of state transitions in the finite state 
machine of a monitored node in each LMU. These 
sequences can be represented as a transition matrix T = 
[Tij], where Tij is the number of times the transition i ? j 
is found. The monitor node invokes a detection algorithm 
every W seconds using data from the most recent D = d * 
W seconds of observations, where d is a small integer. 
The parameter D, called the detection window, should be 
such that it is possible to punish the selfish nodes 
promptly while maintaining a high level of accuracy. 
In the following subsection, some of the important 
issues in designing the proposed algorithm are discussed. 
A. Issues in Algorithm Design 
While a transition matrix summarizes the local routing 
behavior of a monitored node, it is not possible to 
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determine selfish behavior of a node based on its local 
transition probabilities only. By comparing the transition 
matrices of a collection of nodes, one might be able to 
detect selfish nodes with higher confidence than looking 
at the transition matrix of each node individually. 
Keeping this in mind, the proposed algorithm initially 
clusters the neighbors of a monitoring node and then 
classifies the clusters into selfish or cooperative nodes. 
Some of the issues in forming the clusters are as follows:  
First, to make the clustering algorithm robust in 
presence of noise in the data, a statistical theory of 
inference-based approach is followed which takes into 
account the pair-wise comparisons of the transition 
matrices of each pair of nodes. Second, to reliably 
identify which cluster contains the selfish nodes, an 
additional measure of cooperation, called cooperation 
index, for the nodes. The cluster which has its 
cooperation index less than a threshold value is assumed 
to contain the selfish nodes. Finally, a test is developed 
based on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) among the 
clusters to determine whether clustering is informative to 
the purpose of classification.  
The proposed algorithm is described in detail in the 
following subsection. 
B.  The Detection Algorithm 
In the proposed algorithm, a node is assumed to 
monitor the activities of its R neighbors which are 
identified by their respective indices 1, 2,….R. Let [ ])()( rijr fT =  denote the observed transition matrix for the 
rth neighbor, where ][ )(rijf  is the number of transitions 
from state i to state j observed in the previous detection 
window. If m is the number of states in the finite state 
machine in each node, the size of )(rT  is m x m. 
Let ],...[ )()(1
)( r
im
r
i
r ffT = denote the ith row of the transition 
matrix )(rT , which shows the transitions out of state i at 
the neighbor node r. If two neighbor nodes r and s have 
identical distributions corresponding to transitions from 
state i, then one can write )()( si
r
i TT ≡ . 
To test the hypothesis )()( si
r
i TT ≡ the Pearson’s χ2 
test is used as follows.  
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where, )(riF and 
)(s
iF denote total number of 
transitions for state I in )(rT and )(sT respectively. 
If the value of χ2 exceeds the value of χ2m-1,α then the 
hypothesis )()( si
r
i TT ≡  is rejected at confidence interval 
α. If we write rsiK for the event that χ
2
(i) > χ2m-1,α, then the 
conditional probability ( )rsisiri BTTP |)()( ≡  can be taken as 
a reasonable estimator of the similarity between r and s 
with respect to the state i. In absence of any prior 
information, it is reasonable to assume that r and s have 
no similarity in state i and the probability that the Pearson 
test rejects its hypothesis to be 0.5 [13]. 
In order to evaluate the similarity between r and s for 
all the m states, (1) is applied to all rows of T(r) and T(s). 
This yields a vector ][ )()( rsi
rs BB = , {i = 1,…m}. From the 
standard Markovian principle one can write:   
)|( )()()( rssrrs BTTPL ≡=  
    = 
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rsrs SmS −−αα  
                            
)( rsSα≈                                          (2) 
where           ∑
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=
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rs
i
rs BS
1
)()(                                   (3) 
the lower-order terms in the right hand side of (3) are 
ignored since α < < 1.  
For small value of α, Lrs monotonically decreases in 
S(rs), which, as evident from (3), is the number of 
rejections of Pearson’s hypothesis. Therefore, 1 -- Lrs 
may be taken as the measure of the dissimilarity between 
the neighbor nodes r and s. 
In presence of noise in the data, however, it is found 
that for two nodes r and s which have Lrs ≈ 1, a third node 
t may cause inconsistency such that Lrt ≉ Lst. To avoid 
this inconsistency in clustering in the proposed algorithm, 
clustering are not computed on the basis of pair-wise 
dissimilarity. To compute dissimilarity between r and s, 
the L values for all neighbors are computed with respect 
to r and s separately, and the following equation is 
applied:  
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It may be observed that the computation of drs does not 
involve on Lrs - the pair-wise similarity between nodes r 
and s. In fact, it measures the degree of inconsistency in 
similarity between r and s with all their neighbors. Since, 
in the computation, contribution of each neighbor plays 
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its role, drs presents a robust indicator for dissimilarity 
between nodes and plays a crucial part in computing the 
clusters [13]. For clustering, an agglomerative 
hierarchical clustering technique is used. This is a single-
linkage approach in which each cluster is represented by 
all of the objects in the cluster, and the similarity between 
two clusters is measured by the similarity of the closest 
pair of data points belonging to different clusters. The 
cluster merging process repeats until all the objects are 
eventually merged to form one cluster [14]. 
After the nodes are clustered into similar sets, the sets 
are further classified into three groups: (i) a set (G) of 
cooperative nodes, (ii) a set (B) of selfish nodes, and (iii) 
a set of nodes whose behavior could not be ascertained. 
The cooperation score (Cr) of a node is computed as [13]: 
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The set B is most likely to contain the selfish nodes. To 
reduce false positives (i.e. wrongly identifying a 
cooperative node as selfish), an ANOVA test is applied 
as described in [13]. The ANOVA approach computes a 
probability Pk of the random variation among the mean 
cooperation scores of k clusters. A lower value of Pk 
implies that the clusters actually represent distinct 
differences in their behavior. At each iteration, k clusters 
are formed and Pk is compared with a pre-defined level of 
significance β. If Pk < β, clusters are believed to be 
reliably reflecting the behavior of the nodes and their 
classifications are accepted. The cluster with lowest mean 
cooperation score is assumed to contain the selfish nodes. 
If Pk > Pk-1, the neighbor behavior has not been properly 
reflected in the cluster formation, which has led to the 
increase in the value of Pk. In this case, all the nodes are 
classified as cooperative, and the next iteration of the 
algorithm is executed. The confidence parameter β can be 
tuned so as to adjust the alacrity of detection of selfish 
nodes and rate of false positives [13].  
In spite of all the above statistical approaches, there is 
still a possibility of misclassification. The proposed 
algorithm further reduces the probability of 
misclassification by a new cross-checking mechanism. 
For this purpose, a minor modification is suggested in the 
packet header for AODV routing. Two additional fields 
are inserted in the header of a RREQ packet. These fields 
are: next_to_source and duplicate_flag to indicate 
respectively the address of the node that is next hop to the 
source, and whether the packet is a duplicate packet 
which has already been broadcasted by some other nodes 
in the network. In the header of a RREQ packet, in 
addition to the above two fields, another field called 
next_to_destination is added to indicate the address of the 
node to which the packet must be forwarded in the 
reverse path. It has been shown in [16], with the above 
extra fields, it is possible to detect every instance of 
selfish behavior in a wireless network with 100% 
detection accuracy, if the following conditions are 
satisfied: (i) no packet loss lost due to interference, (ii) 
links are bi-directional, (iii) the nodes are stationary, and 
(iv) the queuing delays are bounded. Since all these 
conditions cannot be guaranteed in a real-world 
deployment, there will be always some detection 
inaccuracy. However, the combined approach of the 
robust clustering and the monitoring of packets with 
additional fields substantially increases the detection 
efficiency and reduces the false positives as will be 
evident from the simulation results. 
V.    SIMULATION RESULTS 
The proposed protocol is evaluated with network 
simulator ns-2 (version 2.29) [15] with parameters 
presented in Table III. The objective is to evaluate the 
efficiency of the algorithm and compare its performance 
with the protocol proposed by Wang et al in [13].   
At the start of the simulation, a fraction of nodes are 
chosen randomly as the selfish nodes. A selfish node 
adopts either of the two strategies--dropping RREQs 
(DROP_REQ) or dropping RREPs (DROP_REP). In both 
cases, control packets are dropped with a constant 
probability. For DROP_REP, a selfish node always 
rebroadcasts RREQs even if it has a route in its cache. To 
evaluate the detection efficiency and speed, the packet 
dropping probability is varied from 1.0 to 0.1. β is chosen 
as 0.4 to have the best tradeoff  between detection rate 
and false positive rate.  
TABLE III.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Simulation area 
Simulation duration 
No. of nodes in the network 
MAC protocol 
Routing protocol 
Raw channel bandwidth 
Traffic type 
Network traffic volume 
Packet size 
Time-out for RREQ broadcast 
Time-out for receiving RREP 
Pearson confidence (α) 
Observation window (W) 
Detection window (D) 
Session arrival distribution 
Session duration distribution 
900 m * 900 m 
1600 sec 
50 
802.11b 
AODV 
11 Mbps 
CBR UDP 
60 packets / sec 
512 bytes 
0.5 sec 
3 sec 
0.1 
100 sec 
400 sec 
Poisson 
Exponential 
 
Fig 3 and Fig 4 represent respectively the detection 
rate and the false alarm rate with 50% nodes in the 
network configured as selfish and dropping RREQs (i.e. 
DROP_REQ). The results are the average of 10 runs of 
the simulation. The proposed algorithm performs better 
than Wang’s algorithm since it doubly checks the 
detection results- one from the clustering and the other 
from the routing header information to make a more 
reliable detection. 
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that the packet dropping 
(DROP_REP) has no impact on the detection rate and the 
false positive rate when 50% nodes in the network are 
acting as selfish nodes. This difference in behavior in 
case of DROP_REQ and DROP_REP lies in the fact that 
while RREQ is a broadcast message sent from the source, 
the RREP is sent in a single path by the destination in a 
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unicast manner. Since RREP involves very few number 
of nodes, for majority of the nodes the state machine will 
terminate in state 5, instead of states 7 and 8. It is evident 
from Fig 5. and Fig. 6 that the proposed algorithm has an 
average 80%  increase in detection rate and 50 % 
reduction in false positives.  
 
Figure 3.  Detection rate in DROP_REQ scenario 
       
Figure 4.  Detection rate in DROP_REQ scenario 
 
Figure 5.  Detection rate in DROP_REP scenario 
      
Figure 6.  False alarm rate in DROP_RREP scenario  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Detection of selfish nodes is crucial in WMNs since 
these nodes don’t forward packets for other nodes and 
degrade the performance of the networks.  This paper has 
presented a statistical theory of inference-based clustering 
algorithm for detection of selfish nodes. The routing 
protocol is assumed to be AODV and a finite state 
machine model is developed based on locally observed 
messages in each node. To increase the reliability of 
clustering, an ANOVA test is applied and finally, a new 
cross-checking mechanism is used by inserting extra 
fields in the packet headers.  Simulation results show that 
the algorithm has better detection efficiency and reduced 
false alarm rates compared to some existing mechanisms. 
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